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LNT: A logical neighbor tree secure group communication scheme
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Secure group communication is a paradigm that primarily designates one-to-many com-
munication security. The proposed works relevant to secure group communication have
predominantly considered the whole network as being a single group managed by a central
powerful node capable of supporting heavy communication, computation and storage cost.
However, a typical Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) may contain several groups, and eachKeywords:
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Group key management
one is maintained by a sensor node (the group controller) with constrained resources.
Moreover, the previously proposed schemes require a multicast routing support to deliver
the rekeying messages. Nevertheless, multicast routing can incur heavy storage and com-
munication overheads in the case of a wireless sensor network. Due to these twomajor lim-
itations, we have reckoned it necessary to propose a new secure group communication with
a lightweight rekeying process. Our proposal overcomes the two limitations mentioned
above, and can be applied to a homogeneous WSN with resource-constrained nodes with
no need for a multicast routing support. Actually, the analysis and simulation results have
clearly demonstrated that our scheme outperforms the previous well-known solutions.enera
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the distributed approach, the group is divided into smal
subgroups each of which is managed locally. However,
each subgroup has its different key, this approach presents
the limits of translating the encrypted data when for-
warded from one subgroup to another. In other words, en-
crypted messages need to be decrypted whenever they
reach another subgroup in order to make use of the trans-
mitted data if in-network processing is available. There-
fore, it may introduce a computation overhead. As for the
contributed approach, each group member contributes in
the computation of the group key which leads to a heavy
complexity and communication cost.
Taking into account the limitations of the distributed
and contributed approach, many schemes have opted to
the centralized approach. The trivial solution to deliver
the group key, in the centralized approach, is to send it
by unicast to each group member. However, this solution
requires an O(n) communication cost complexity, where
n is the number of group members. So, numerous schemes
have been proposed for the sake of reducing the communi-
cation, computation and storage cost needed for the rekey-
ing process [3–7].
However, the majority of the proposed schemes assume
that the group controller is a powerful node such as a PC or
a base station. Actually, they consider the whole network
as being a single group managed by the base station. How-
ever, this presents a restrictive definition of a group and a
network model. As a matter of fact, in some applications
several groups managed by resource-constrained sensor
nodes might be needed. In addition, the proposed schemes
such as [3–6] suppose that the network has a multicast
routing support to deliver the rekeying messages in a mul-
ticast way. However, multicast routing introduces a heavy
overhead and communication cost for maintaining the
multicast table and the multicast routes. Moreover, the
rekeying messages used in the majority of previous
schemes present some security vulnerabilities. For exam-
ple, some schemes such as LKH [3], and TKH [5], are not
protected against replay attacks. Hence, an attacker can re-
play a revealed group key in order to intercept the commu-
nication. Revoked nodes can also replay an old group key in
order to rejoin the group. In addition, some schemes [3,5,6]
do not consider rekeying messages authentication which
makes them vulnerable to messages injection attacks.
As a matter of fact, the previous schemes’ limitations,
described above, have given us ground to conceive a new
secure group communication scheme. The strengths of
the proposed scheme are that it can be applied to a group
with a resource-constrained group controller, does not re-
quire a multicast routing support and is robust against pos-
sible attacks.
1.1. Contribution
This paper proposes a secure group communication
scheme that allows sensor nodes belonging to the same
group to communicate securely. The proposed scheme is
composed of two main components: the group member-
ship management and the group key management. The
group membership management component defines in a
secure manner the group creation, the group join and the
group leave processes. The group key management compo-
nent presents a lightweight method to update the groupkey after each membership change for the sake of guaran-
teeing forward and backward secrecy properties. The pro-
posed method is based on the construction of a logical
neighbor tree that helps to share the task of rekeying mes-
sages distribution among the group members. Therefore,
our scheme eliminates the necessity of a powerful group
controller and so that can fit resource-constrained sensor
nodes.
The idea of secure group communication with resource-
constrained group controller was first addressed by Che-
ikhrouhou et al. in their paper RiSeG [8,9]. Yet, the
proposed scheme presents an O(n) latency in the rekeying
process and, therefore, cannot endure large scale WSNs.
Moreover, RiSeG requires synchronization between nodes
in order to avoid replay attacks. However, synchronization
is a hard task to be achieved in a WSN [10].
As an improvement, a Logical Neighbor Tree (LNT) is
proposed in order to distribute the key update messages.
Actually, the LNT scheme enables to reduce the key update
latency from O(n) to O(log(n)). In addition, LNT eliminates
the requirement of node synchronization.
In summary, LNT is distinguished by the following
features:
 The concept of group is application-based, i.e., groups
reflect the application needs.
 The group controller could be a sensor node with con-
strained resources.
 The LNT scheme proposes the membership manage-
ment and the group key management in an efficient
and secure way.
1.2. Roadmap
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents relevant work to secure group commu-
nication in WSNs. Section 3 presents the network model,
the adversarial model, requirements and assumptions used
in our work. Section 4 gives an overview of the LNT scheme
and its design principles. Sections 5–7 describe the LNT
membership management, the logical neighbor tree for-
mation and the LNT rekeying process, respectively. Sec-
tion 8 presents a comparison between the LNT rekeying
process and other well-known group key management
schemes namely, LKH [3], TKH [5], and RiSeG [8]. Section 9
presents a security analysis of the LNT scheme. Finally, we
conclude and give possible future work.2. Related work
In the literature, there are a few works that detail a
complete secure group communication schemes with its
different components. The proposed SGC schemes in the
recent decade are [11,12,8,9].
In [11], the authors proposed SLIMCAST: a secure level
key infrastructure for multicast to protect data confidenti-
ality via hop-by-hop re-encryption and mitigate the DoS-
based flooding attack through an intrusion detection and
deletion mechanism. The SLIMCAST protocol divides a
group routing tree into levels and branches in a clustered
way. Communications among nodes at each level of each
branch of the group tree are protected by a level key in
such a way that only the local level key is updated during
a joining or a leaving process. The scheme presents a low
communication overheads and power consumption and
also is scalable. However, the performance is degraded
(i.e., high power consumption) when membership changes
are massive [2].
In [12], the authors proposed SeGCom a secure group
communications mechanism for cluster tree wireless sen-
sor networks. The scheme uses Blundo technique [13] in
order to share a pairwise key between each pair of nodes.
However, in order to broadcast the group controller iden-
tity, the scheme uses lTESLA, which requires synchroniza-
tion between nodes. Moreover, the scheme did not explain
how the authentication process is done and it presents an
O(n) communication overhead.
The RiSeG (Ring based Secure Group communication)
[9,8] scheme has addressed the secure group communica-
tion problem with a constrained group controller. The idea
of the scheme is to divide the group controller task among
group members by constructing a logical ring architecture.
This logical ring permits to deliver the rekeying messages
as follows. The group controller sends the rekeying mes-
sage to the next hop in the ring and then the message will
be forwarded from a node to another until the message re-
turns back to the group controller. The scheme reduces the
communication, computation and storage cost at the group
controller, but it introduces a big latency that cannot scale
with a large group. Indeed, the latency of the rekeying pro-
cess is O(n).
The main concern of a secure group communication
scheme is the group key management. Several group key
management systems for WSNs have been proposed
[3,4,14,5,6,15–19].
The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [3] permits to reduce
the number of rekeying message from O(n) to O(log(n)).
The idea of the LKH scheme is based on dividing the group
into subgroups and then generating a key encryption key
(KEK) for each subgroup. This KEK will then serve to se-
curely deliver the group key to the appropriate subgroup.
The group controller maintains a logical key hierarchy in
which it associates a group member to each leaf node.
The root of this hierarchy is the group key, the internal
nodes represent the KEKs, and the leaves are the symmetric
key shared with the corresponding group member. Each
group member maintains the keys lying on the path from
the leaf to the root. The KEK allows to replace several uni-
cast rekeying messages by a single multicast one. This
technique enables to reduce the number of rekeying mes-
sages from O(n) to O(log(n)). However, the LKH scheme
introduces additional computation and storage cost, espe-
cially at the group controller.
Many improvements [4–6,14] were designed to the LKH
scheme. The OKD (One-way Key Derivation) [4] scheme
further reduces the number of rekeying messages by
means of a local computation of the group key, using a
one-way hash function. In fact, in a join operation current
group members compute the new key as k0 = H(k), where H
is a one-way hash function and k is the current key. There-
fore, the group controller needs to send the new key onlyto the new member, and thus, the number of rekeying
message is reduced to a single message in the join opera-
tion. For the leave operation, the number of the rekeying
messages remains O(log(n)).
The S2RP (Secure and Scalable Rekeying Protocol) [14]
permits to further secure the rekeying process by authen-
ticating the rekeying messages using a one-way-hash func-
tion as well as a key-chain. As LKH, the S2RP scheme
constructs a logical key hierarchy, in which each internal
node has a separate key-chain. The key-chain is extracted
using a One-Way-Hash-Function (H), so that each element
in the key-chain is the image of the next one under H. The
chain keys are then revealed in the reverse order of their
creation. Therefore, on receiving a key, the group members
would check its authenticity by verifying that k = H(k0),
where k0 is the new key and k is the current key. However,
this technique compromises the properties of backward
security as a new joining member might reveal the previ-
ous keys by simply computing the hash of the newly-re-
ceived key, repeatedly. This has led the authors to
introduce an additional key called join-key (KJ). This key
is renewed whenever a new node joins the group, and
the group key is a mixture of the current key-chain at
the root node in the tree and this KJ. In order to minimize
the rekeying message, the new key KJ is locally renewed
by computing K0J = h(KJ). The scheme performance is simi-
lar to that of the LKH. The difference is that in S2RP, the
node must store, along with the current key of internal
nodes, the key KJ as well as the key KC (to authenticate
command). The node has also to store more than one hash
function (He, Hj, Hc). Moreover, the group controller has a
heavy storage cost as it must store the key-chain (instead
of a single key in the LKH scheme case) of each internal
node. The CSET (Computation and Storage Efficient Tree)
[6] scheme permits to improve the LKH efficiency by con-
sidering the available sensor nodes resources when con-
structing the logical tree. The TKH (Topological Key
Hierarchy) [5] scheme allows to reduce the communica-
tion cost of the rekeying messages delivery by mapping
the logical key tree to the physical topology. The idea is
to construct a key tree that reflects the physical topology
of the network. However, TKH does not face with group
key authentication.
LARK is the first group key management system that
supports a group topology defined by applications [15].
In LARK, sensor nodes are logically grouped according to
application needs and not for network management pur-
poses. The resulting group topology model is quite general
and encompasses multiple groups, organized hierarchi-
cally, and possibly overlapping. Such a group model is par-
ticularly appropriate for Wireless Sensor and Actuator
Networks (WSANs), a new paradigm that is asserting itself
in the networked embedded system world [20]. LARK fea-
tures a centralized group key management service and
owes its efficiency to a novel integration of two well-
known basic mechanisms: key chains [21], for efficient
key authentication, and key graphs [3], for efficient key
distribution. However, LARK assumes both a resource-rich
group manager and multicast routing, as necessary.
In LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Pro-
tocol)[16], the authors proposed a key management proto-
col for sensor networks that are designed to support in-
network processing, while at the same time restricting
the security impact of a node compromise to the immedi-
ate network neighborhood of the compromised node. LEAP
endures the establishment of four types of keys for each
sensor node – an individual key shared with the base sta-
tion, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a
cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and
a global key shared by all the nodes in the network. For
the update of the global key LEAP assumes the use of a
routing protocol in which the nodes are organized into a
spanning tree. However, this assumption limits the deploy-
ment of the scheme. Moreover, the scheme rests on the
lTESLA scheme [22] for the broadcast authentication. The
lTESLA assumes synchronization between nodes, which
is a hard task to achieve in WSN [10].
Exclusion Basis System (EBS) proposed a combinatorial
clustering that attempts to minimize the number of rekey-
ing messages while minimizing the number of keys stored
by each sensor node [17,23,24]. In order to achieve this
goal, EBS organizes nodes into overlapping groups that
are, however, completely unrelated to the application
needs [17]. Furthermore, two EBS-based rekeying schemes
require the knowledge of the positions of sensor nodes
[23,19]. Implementing a location service in WSNs, espe-
cially a secure one, is quite a difficult task [15].
3. Network model and security requirements
This section is devoted to the presentation of the net-
work model to which the proposed secure group commu-
nication scheme is applied as along with the adversarial
model and requirements.
3.1. Network model
It is worth noting that a wireless sensor network main-
tained by a base station is considered in this study. As for
the information within the network, it is routed using a
routing protocol such as Ad hoc On Demand Distance
Vector routing algorithm (AODV) [25] or Dynamic Source
Routing algorithm (DSR) [26]. In addition, the following
types of nodes have also been considered:
 The Base Station (BS): is responsible for securing the
whole network. It maintains a table containing the
group controller addresses corresponding to each
group. The base station is secure and able to detect all
compromised nodes. Detection of compromised nodes
can be actually achieved by means of an Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) such as [27–30]. The BS main-
tains a blacklist containing the identity of compromised
nodes. These nodes will not be allowed to join any
group in the future and are, therefore, excluded from
the network.
 The Group Controller (GC): is a node responsible for
maintaining the security inside its group. To note, no
security property has been assumed for the GC.
 The End Device (ED): is a node which belongs to one or
multiple groups. For each group, it maintains the groupcontroller, the parent node and the child nodes’
addresses.
We also assume that each group has a unique group
identifier, which represents the sensory information corre-
sponding to this group. These group identifiers are known
to all nodes. This can be done by loading the group identi-
fiers to nodes at the deployment phase.
3.2. Adversarial model
For the adversarial model, we assume that an attacker
can eavesdrop, modify, replay, and inject messages. This
is due to the wireless medium. The attacker can also com-
promise a node. So the following attacks can be launched
in our WSNs:
 Eavesdropping: an attacker may eavesdrop communi-
cation inside a group. A solution to mitigate this attack
is to encrypt communication.
 Impersonation attack: an attacker may impersonate a
legal user to gain access to a group. A solution to miti-
gate this attack is to authenticate node and message’
source.
 Replay attack: an attacker may replay an old message to
gain access to a group or to disturb the operation of a
group. A solution to mitigate this attack is to add a
sequence number indicating the freshness of the
message.
 Injecting false message: an attacker may inject false
message to disturb the operation inside a group or to
eavesdrop encrypted data.
 Compromise attack: an attacker may compromise a
sensor node. After compromising the node an attacker
may reveal secret key and all information stored on that
sensor.
3.3. Requirements
In what follows, the requirements to be achieved by a
secure group communication scheme are presented:
 Nodes belonging to the same group must communicate
securely and their exchanged information must not be
revealed to non-member nodes even if they belong to
the same network.
 A node may belong to more than one group. However, it
must store a per-group profile containing the GC
address, the group key, the group identifier, etc.
 Compromised nodes must be ejected from the group as
soon as they are detected.
 Multi-hop communication paradigm is employed
between nodes in order to deliver encrypted messages.
Note that intermediate nodes forward encrypted mes-
sages without knowing their content.
 Both backward and forward secrecy must be achieved.
Backward secrecy means that a node joining the group
must not reveal previous exchanged information. For-
ward secrecy means that a node leaving the group must
not reveal future exchanged information.
Table 1
Notations.
Notations Meaning
Ni Sensor node with identity Ni
Gid Group identity
MAC(m,K) Message Authentication Code (MAC) computed over
the messagem using the key k. The messagem refers to
current message’ fields except the MAC (ex; in
join-request, m = Ni, Gid, nonceNi)
Nonce Is a random number used once. It permits to ensure
replay attack protection
KNi, Nj Pairwise key shared between node Ni and node Nj
{m}K Message m encrypted with key K
Table 2
Computation cost parameters.
Notations Meaning
Cenc The computation cost needed to compute the
encryption of the group key
Cdec The computation cost needed to compute a decryption
operation on the group key
Cekg The computation cost needed to generate an elliptic
curve private/public keys
Csign The computation cost needed to generate a signature
Cverif The computation cost needed to verify a signature
Ckg The computation cost needed to generate a group key
Ckc The computation cost needed to compute a pairwise
key
Cmac The computation cost needed to compute a message
authentication code (MAC)
Table 3
Communication cost parameters.
Notations Meaning
jmj The size in bits of the message m
mjr Join-request message
mlr Leave-request message
mjk Join-key message
mji Join-inform message
mci Group-creation-invite message
mcd Group creation decision message i.e.
Grp-creation-accept or Grp-creation-refuse message
mku Key-update message
mnd Neighbor discovery message
mcu Child update message
mpu Parent update message
mpr Parent request message
etx The energy consumed for the transmission of 1 bit
erx The energy consumed for the reception of 1 bit
Table 4
Execution time parameters.
Parameter Signification
Tenc Time needed to encrypt the group key
Tdec Time needed to decrypt the group key
Tsign Time needed to generate a signature
Tverif Time needed to verify a signature
Tkg Time needed to generate a group key
Tkc Time needed to compute the pairwise key
Tmac Time needed to compute a MAC
Ttx Time needed for the transmission of 1 bit
Trx Time needed for the reception of 1 bit
Tnd Time needed by the neighbor discovery process Security parameters’ maintenance such as the rekeying
process must be lightweight and effective.
4. LNT overview and design principles
The idea of the LNT scheme is based on distributing the
rekeying process task among group members. Indeed, as
the group controller is a sensor node with constrained re-
sources, it cannot support the delivery of rekeying mes-
sages to all group members, nor can it stand the heavy
storage cost introduced by the key encryption keys of theLKH-based schemes. Therefore, we propose to construct a
logical neighbor tree that helps deliver the rekeying mes-
sages inside the group.
The logical neighbor tree represents the neighborhood
relationship among the group members. The root of the
tree represents the group controller which is connected
to its neighbor nodes, and each nodes of these neighbor
nodes is connected to its neighbor nodes and so on until
covering all group members. The whole tree is maintained
by the group controller, and each group member maintains
only the list of its child nodes. On receiving a key update
message from its parent node, the current node forwards
this key update message to its child nodes. Therefore, the
key update message sent by the group controller will be
forwarded from parent to child nodes until reaching all
group members. In this way, the group controller should
send key update messages only to its neighbors instead
of sending it to all the group members.
The key update message contains the new group key
that must be kept exclusively secret among the group
members. Consequently, this message has to be protected
against potential interception attacks. This is achieved by
means of encryption. In addition, for the sake of preventing
a malicious node from injecting false key update messages,
the group controller computes a digital signature which is
verified by the group members. The validity of the signa-
ture proves that the key update message is indeed sent
by the group controller and not by a malicious node. As
for the replay attack robustness, it is achieved by means
of a sequence number shared among the group members.
To sum it up, LNT helps to eliminate the heavy storage
cost introduced by the key encryption keys used in the
LKH-based schemes and, simultaneously, provides both
authentication and robustness against replay attacks of
the rekeying messages.5. LNT membership management
This section, is allocated to the presentation of the dif-
ferent membership processes of the LNT scheme, specifi-
cally, the group creation, the group join and the group
leave processes. It is worth noting that these processes
must be executed in a secure way so as to avoid any possi-
ble illegal access to the network (during the group creation
and the group join processes) as well as the denial-of-ser-
vice (DoS) attack against the network (e.g. by sending fake
leave-requests during the group leave process).
Table 5
LNT parameters.
Notations Meaning
d Average number of the tree degree (corresponds to the
average number of child node)
h The tree height (corresponds to the number of levels,
the root is at level 0)
n Number of group members (n ¼ 1dhþ11d
 
for a balanced
tree)
hop Average number of hops between two group members
b Average number of neighbor nodes belonging to the
same group of a node
Pi The selected parent of the joining nodeAfter describing each process, we present the analytical
performance study. The chosen performance metrics are
the computation cost, the communication cost and the
execution time.
The computation cost can be measured in terms of time,
use of CPU or energy dissipation. In fact, these parameters
are related and each one can be deduced from the other.
For instance, the energy dissipation can be deduced from
the time as follows: Energy = Power  Time, where Power
represents the CPU power when it is in its active state
and Time represents the computing time. In the present
analysis, the term cost is used in its general form and we
have not specified the unit (which can be second, Joule
or number of CPU cycles). The computation cost of each
membership process can be computed as the sum of the
computation cost of the main operations executed during
this membership process. The main operations required
in the LNT scheme are presented in Table 2 and they are
namely: the encryption/decryption operation, the signa-
ture generation/verification operation, the generation of a
key and the MAC operation.
The main factor of the communication cost is the en-
ergy dissipation. The communication cost is computed
using the same approach as TKH [5]. Actually, the commu-
nication cost in terms of energy dissipation is computed as
the size of sent/received messages multiplied by the en-
ergy dissipated for the sent/reception of one bit. The differ-
ent messages used in LNT scheme are presented in Table 3.
The execution time is the time needed for the execution
of the overall process: time between the beginning of the
membership operation and its end. The different parame-
ters related to the execution time are explained Table 4.
The different notations used throughout this section
are, respectively, explained in Tables 1–5.5.1. Pre-deployment phase
As in [9], we propose to apply the key pre-distribution
scheme proposed by Blundo et al. [13] in order to share a
symmetric key between each pair of nodes. The network
administrator chooses a t degree bi-variate polynomial
over a finite field Fq: f ðx; yÞ ¼
Pi¼t
i¼0
Pj¼t
j¼0ai;jx
iyj. The value
of q is a prime number that is large enough to accommo-
date a cryptographic key. Then, the administrator loads
in each node Ni the polynomial f(x,Ni). The function f issymmetric. This means that, when two nodes Ni and Nj
wish to share a pairwise key, each of them computes
KNi,Nj = f(Ni,Nj) = f(Nj,Ni).
Moreover, to ensure rekeying message authentication, a
digital signature scheme was used. The Elliptic Curve Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [31] was chosen as its
feasibility in WSNs [32,33] was demonstrated, and that it
is more suitable than other signature schemes (such as
RSA) in the context of WSNs, due to the use of small key
size (reduce the storage cost) [34–36]. Each node is pre-
loaded with the domain parameters needed to compute
and verify the ECDSA [31]. The domain parameters are
the six-tuple T = (p,a,b,G,r,h), where p is a prime number,
a and b are two points from the primary field Fp (a,b 2 Fp)
defining the curve, G a base point on the curve with order
r and cofactor f.
5.2. Group creation process
5.2.1. Description
The group creation process is executed when a node re-
quests to join a non-existent group. In this case, and after
having successfully authenticated the node, the Base Sta-
tion (BS) would invite it to be the Group Controller (GC)
of the requested group. The group creation process is de-
picted in Fig. 1 and is executed according to the following
steps:
1. The node sends a join-request message. This message
contains the node identity Ni, the requested group iden-
tity Gid, and a random number used only once nonceNi.
This message is protected by a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) field computed over the message and using
the pairwise key KBS,Ni shared between the node Ni and
the BS.
2. Upon receiving this message, the BS verifies the validity
of the node, i.e., that the node does not belong to the
black list of compromised nodes. Then the BS checks
the message authenticity by comparing the received
MAC to the locally computed one using the pairwise
key KBS,Ni shared with this node Ni. If the node’s identity
is valid, and the message is authentic and the requested
group does not exist yet, the BS sends a grp-creation-
invite message containing the node nonce nonceNi, and
a new generated one nonceBS. This message enables to
authenticate the BS.
3. After authenticating the BS by verifying the MAC field,
the node has to decide whether to be a group controller
or not. If it does, it sends a grp-creation-accept message.
If it does not, the node sends a grp-creation-refuse mes-
sage. Note that, a node might refuse to become a GC, for
instance, if it does not have enough resources to achieve
the GC task. Both messages contain the received nonce
nonceBS and are protected by a MAC. This permits to
avoid any potential replay attack and guarantees the
node authentication.
4. Upon receiving the node response the BS verifies the
validity of the received message. In case the BS receives
a grp-creation-refuse message, it ignores the node
request and the group is not created. If the BS receives
a grp-creation-accept message a new group is being
Fig. 1. Group creation.created and the BS memorizes the group controller
address of the newly created group Gid. Moreover, the
GC and the BS agree on a specific sequence number
seqNbr. This sequence number is incremented at each
message sent and permits to avoid replay attacks, as
will be explained later.
Noteworthy, the GC maintains two sequence numbers.
A seqNbr shared with the BS and another seqNbr shared
with the group members used for communication inside
the group. The seqNbr shared with the BS is incremented
for each communication with the BS (e.g. join-inform mes-
sage) and the seqNbr shared among the group members is
updated for any group-related communication (e.g. key-
update message).
Moreover, in order to sign subsequent key-update mes-
sages the group controller needs a public/private key. For
this purpose, the GC selects a random integer dG in the
interval [1,r  1] and then computes QG = dG  G. The tuple
(dG, QG) respectively represents the GC’s private and public
keys.5.2.2. Performance evaluation
The group creation process involves three categories of
nodes, namely:
 The joining node (Ni): is the node that sends a join-
request message to the BS and becomes a GC if it
accepts.
 The base station (BS): interacts and authenticates the
requesting node.
 The intermediate nodes (IN): are nodes located on the
routing path between the joining node and the BS. Their
task is to route messages exchanged between the BS
and Ni.
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT
scheme during the group creation process is calculated,
in this section, at both the joining node (Ni) and the base
station (BS). This calculation is as follows: Ni: Computation cost = Ckc + 3Cmac + Cekg
 BS: Computation cost = Ckc + 3Cmac
The joining node, needs to compute the pairwise key
shared with the base station using the Blundo technique
(Ckc), three MACs (3Cmac) and an elliptic curve private/pub-
lic keys (Cekg). The BS computes also the pairwise key KBS,Ni,
which requires (Ckc) along with three MACs (3Cmac). Note
that, Ni and BS have the same computation cost, this is
due to the fact that each computed MAC must be recom-
puted at the receiver in order to be verified.
Communication cost. The communication cost of the LNT
scheme group creation process is calculated, in this
section, at the joining node, the base station, and the inter-
mediate node. This calculation is as follows:
 Ni: jmjrjetx + jmcijerx + jmcdjetx
 BS: jmjrjerx + jmcijetx + jmcdjerx
 IN: (jmjrj + jmcij + jmcdj)(etx + erx)
An intermediate node (IN) would forward each message
exchanged between the node Ni and the BS, so that the
communication cost is equivalent to the size of exchanged
messages multiplied by (etx + erx).
Execution time. The execution time of the group creation
process is:
Tgc = 2Tkc + 6Tmac + (jmjrj + jmcij + jmcdj).hopBS ,Ni.Ttx,
where hopBS ,Ni is the number of hops between Node Ni
and the BS.5.3. Group join process
5.3.1. Description
Once the group is created, the BS informs the GC about
each subsequent join-request after successfully authenti-
cating the requesting node. The requesting node authenti-
cation is achieved through the BS as it holds a global
overview of the compromised nodes. Consequently, if a
node fails to successfully pass the authentication process,
its request will be ignored.
Fig. 2. Group join.The group join process is depicted in Fig. 2 and is exe-
cuted as follows:
1. The node Ni sends a join-request message.
2. Upon receiving this message, the BS verifies the node
authenticity. If the node is successfully authenticated,
the BS informs the GC of the requested group about
the join of the new node Ni. In order to prevent a com-
promised node already evicted from the group from
replaying an old join-inform message, we protect this
message with a seqNbr.
3. On receiving the join-informmessage, the GC verifies its
freshness based on the seqNbr before generating a new
group key which it transmits to the node Ni.
4. Upon receiving the join-key message, the node Ni
launches a neighbor discovery process. For this purpose,
Ni broadcasts a neighbor-discovery-requestmessage con-
taining the group identity (Gid). Then, each neighbor
node Nj belonging to the group Gid responds to Ni by
sending a neighbor-discovery-reply message. The neigh-
bor-discovery-reply message contains the number of
child nodes attached to Nj and the number of hops from
Nj to the GC (i.e how far the node Nj is from the GC).
5. After that, the newly joined node Ni chooses the appro-
priate parent from the list of responding neighbors. The
node Ni then informs the GC about its selected parentby sending a parent-update message. The neighbor dis-
covery and parent selection processes are more
explained in Section 5.
6. When the GC receives a parent-updatemessage from Ni,
it first checks the validity of the node Pi. Then, the GC
asks the selected parent node to add Ni to its child list.
The GC also updates the local tree.
Notes:
 The join process must go through the BS which main-
tains the list of the compromised nodes. These nodes
must be eliminated from the network.
 In case the selected parent node is invalid, the GC
requests the node Ni to search for another parent.
 If a node has no neighbor member of the requested
group, the GC takes the responsibility to send the key-
update message to the newly joining node. So, the GC
would add this node to its child in the logical tree.
The neighbor discovery process could also be extended
to more than one-hop neighbor. So far, if a node does
not find a one-hop neighbor at first, it can look for a
2-hop neighbor, 3-hop neighbor, etc. until finding the
nearest node that can be its parent. This extension of
the neighbor discovery process minimizes the number
of child node attached to the GC in case the group
members are not close to each other. The search of a t-
hop neighbor (t > 1) can be implemented by the broad-
cast of a neighbor-discovery-request message containing
a hop field initialized to t and decremented by each
intermediate node before re-broadcasting it. This neigh-
bor discovery message is transmitted from neighbor to
neighbor until the value of hop reaches 0.
 The replay attack on thejoin-request message was not
addressed as there is no interest for an attacker to
replay this message (absence of risk). In fact, suppose
an attacker intercepts an old join-request message, and
then he replays it. Two cases are possible:
1. Either the victim node is still within the group: in
this case, the GC would ignore the request,
2. or the victim node is leaving the group: in this case,
even if the attacker succeeds in passing the routing
protocol, the received message will be encrypted by
the pairwise key shared between the GC and Ni. As a
result, the attacker can neither reveal information of
the group, nor send the message in the group.
5.3.2. Performance evaluation
The group join process involves four categories of node:
The joining node (Ni), the base station (BS), the group con-
troller (GC), and the Ni parent node (Pi). The GC is respon-
sible for maintaining the group members, the group key
and the LNT structure.
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT
scheme during the group join process is calculated, in this
section, for the four categories of nodes mentioned above;
Ni, BS, GC, and Pi. This calculation is as follows:
 Ni: computation cost = 2Ckc + 2Cmac + Cdec
 BS: computation cost = 2Ckc + 2Cmac
 GC: computation cost = 3Ckc + 3Cmac + Ckg + Cenc
 Pi: computation cost = Ckc + Cmac
The joining node, needs to compute two pairwise keys:
the one shared with the base station and the one shared
with the GC (2Ckc), two MACs (2Cmac), and a decryption
(Cdec). The GC interacts first with BS to receive the join-in-
form message, and then with the joining node and sends to
it the encrypted group key, and then with the parent of the
joining node to maintain the tree, and finally with its chil-
dren to send them the key-update message.
Communication cost. The communication cost of the LNT
scheme group join process is calculated, in this section, for
Ni, BS, GC, and Pi. This calculation is as follows:
 Ni: jmjrjetx + jmjkjerx + jmndjetx + bjmndjerx + jmpujetx
 BS: jmjrjerx + jmjijetx
 GC: jmjijerx + jmjkjetx + jmpujerx + jmcujetx
 Pi: jmndjerx + jmndjetx + jmcujerx
The GC receives a join-inform from the BS, sends a join-
key to Ni, receives a parent-update message from the Ni,
sends a child-update to Pi and then sends a key-update to
its children.
Execution time. It refers to time occurring between the
sending of the join-request by Ni and the receiving of the
child-update message by its parent.The execution time of the group join process is:
Tgj = (Tkc + Tmac + jmjrj.hopBS,Ni. Ttx)Ni + (Tkc + Tmac + Tkc +
Tmac + jmjij.hopBS,GC. Ttx)BS + (Tkc + Tmac + Tkc + Tmac + Tkg +
Tenc + jmjkj.hopGC, Ni.Ttx)GC + (Tkc + Tmac + Tdec + Tnd + jmpuj.
hopGC,Ni. Ttx)Ni + (Tkc + Tmac + jmcuj.hopGC,Pi.Ttx)GC
Tgj = 7Tkc + 7Tmac + Tkg + Tenc + Tdec + Tnd + (jmjrj.hopBS, Ni +
jmjij.hopBS,GC + jmjkj.hopGC,Ni + jmpuj.hopGC,Ni + jmcuj.hopGC, Pi).
Ttx, where hopX,Y is the number of hops on the path between
Node X and Node Y.
5.4. Group leave process
5.4.1. Description
A node can decide to leave the group, for instance, when
its mission is over. In this case, the node explicitly leaves
the group by sending a leave-request message. A node
can also be forced to leave, for instance, if it is detected
as compromised. In both cases, the GC must maintain the
LNT tree and update the group key to achieve forward se-
crecy. Fig. 3 presents an explicit leave scenario.
1. The leaving node sends to the GC a leave-request mes-
sage containing its identity, the group identity and pro-
tected by a sequence number and a MAC.
2. On receiving this message, the GC verifies the authen-
ticity of the message. Then, the GC sends a child-update
message to Ni’s parent in order to remove Ni from its
child list. The child-update message is also protected
by a MAC. This MAC prevents attackers from launching
a DoS attack by sending fake child-updatemessages that
cause the removal of group members.
3. In order to maintain the logical neighbor tree, for each
Ni’s child node, the GC sends a parent-request message
that invites the node to search for another parent.
4. The tree maintenance continues idem to the tree main-
tenance in the group join process: After selecting a new
parent, each child node Ck sends a parent-update mes-
sage to the GC, which in turn asks the selected parent
to update its child node list. The GC updates also the
local tree.
5. Finally, the GC launches the key-update process to
renew the group key. The evicted node will not receive
this new key as it is evicted from the logical tree.
Notes:
 The logical neighbor tree must be saved at the GC as it
needs to know this tree structure in the case of a node
compromise. In fact, suppose that the GC would like to
revoke the node Ni, the GC must, in this case, eliminate
the node Ni from the LNT. To this end, the GC would tell
Ni’s parent to remove Ni from its child list and tell Ni’s
child to find another parent. After that, the GC would
update the group key, which would not reach the com-
promised node Ni as it is ejected from the tree.
 We assume that each sent message is acknowledged.
So, after a number of attempts, if the sender does not
succeed to receive an acknowledgment message, it will
suppose that the link is no more available. Therefore, if
a node fails or leaves the group without a notice, child
nodes will detect that the communication with their
Fig. 3. Group leave.parent is no longer available and so, will re-find another
parent. Therefore, the leaving without a notice is similar
to an explicit leaving.
 If the GC fails, one solution is that: the first child node
that detect the GC failure will send a message to the
BS informing it about GC failure. Then, the BS will invite
this node to be the new GC. After that, the BS sends a
broadcast message to inform group members about
the address of the new GC. Then, every group member
will send to this new GC a parent update message
informing it about the address of its parent. Thanks to
these parent update messages, the new GC can con-
struct the LNT tree.
 With reference to step 1, in the case a node is suspected
to be compromised and thus has to be evicted, it is the
base station that sends the leave-request message to
the group controller. The message is formatted as spec-
ified in step 1. Its authenticity is guaranteed by attach-
ing a MAC computed by means of the key shared
between the BS and the GC.
 It is worthwhile to notice that the logical tree is only
used to disseminate rekeying messages. Logical tree
management messages (e.g. child-update and parent-update messages) are instead routed by the chosen
routing protocol (Section 3.1). Therefore, particular
attention is necessary if the leaving/evicted node lies
on the route from the GC to its parent and/or children
(steps 2–3).
In the case of a leaving node this is not a problem at all.
A leaving node leaves the group because its mission is over.
However, it is genuine and therefore correctly cooperates
towards the application and the system services (i.e, rout-
ing, key management, et cetera). Thus, the leaving node
first routes child-update and parent-update messages, as
needed, so contributing to establishing a new logical tree,
and then actually leaves.
In the case of an evicted node things are more compli-
cated. An evicted node is a node that the IDS has suspected
as compromised. Thus we cannot rely on its cooperation. In
particular, we cannot rely on its cooperation in routing
child-update and parent-update messages. This means that
the presence of a compromised node may cause a partition
in the network and, consequently, in the logical tree. How-
ever, this form of DoS is a fundamental problem whose
solution pertains to the routing service rather than the
key management service. If we wish to avoid that the pres-
ence of a compromised node might cause a network parti-
tion then we have to adopt techniques such as redundant
deployment, secure and multipath routing [37].
Of course, LNT gives its contribution to avoid DoS but at
its layer. Actually, by guaranteeing authenticity and fresh-
ness of both tree and key management messages, LNT
avoids that an adversary may cause any harm by transmit-
ting fake ones. Furthermore, provided that the underlying
routing service provides enough connectivity upon a
node’s leaving, LNT is able to establish a logical tree of gen-
uine nodes that correctly forward key management mes-
sages upon rekeying.
5.4.2. Performance evaluation
The group leave process involves the following catego-
ries of node: the leaving node (Ni): is the node that sends
a leave-request message to the GC, the group controller
(GC), the intermediate node (IN), the Ni’s parent node
(Pi), the Ni’s child nodes (Ci).
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT
scheme during the group leave process is calculated, in this
section, for three types of nodes: Ni, GC, and Pi. This calcu-
lation is as follows:
 Ni: computation cost = Ckc + Cmac
 GC: computation cost = 2Ckc + 2Cmac
 Pi: computation cost = Ckc + Cmac
Communication cost. The communication cost of the LNT
scheme group leave process is calculated, in this section,
for three types of nodes: Ni, GC, and Pi. This calculation
is as follows:
 Ni: jmlrjetx (or 0 in case of a silently leaving)
 GC: jmlrjerx + jmcujetx + djmpujerx
 Pi: jmcujerx + jmlrjerx + jmlrjetx
 Ci: jmprjerx + jmndjetx + bjmndjerx + jmpujetx
A child node of the leaving node receives a parent-re-
quest message (jmprjerx), send a neighbor-discovery mes-
sage (jmndjetx), receives b neighbor-reply (bjmndjerx) and
sends a parent-update message (jmpujetx).
Execution time. The execution time of the group leave
process is:
Tgl = (Tkc + Tmac + jmlrj.hopGC,Ni.Ttx) + (Tkc + Tmac + Tkc + Tmac +
jmcuj.hopGC,Pi.Ttx) + d.(jmprj.hopGC,Ck.Ttx + Tnd + jmpuj.hopGC,Ck.
Ttx + Tkc + Tmac + jmcuj.hopGC,Pk.Ttx).
Tgl = (3 + d)Tkc + (3 + d)Tmac + (jmlrj.hopGC,Ni + hopGC,Pi. jmcuj +
d.hopGC,Ck.jmprj +d.hopGC,Ck.jmpuj + d.hopGC,Pk.jmcuj).Ttx.
6. LNT tree management
This section is devoted to an exemplified illustration of
the LNT tree construction and update when a node joins or
leaves the group. Consider the following physical network
topology presented in Fig. 4. For simplicity, we have pre-
sented a network with one group, but which can be gener-
alized to multiple groups with several group controllers.
The corresponding LNT tree maintained at the GC is pre-
sented in Fig. 5. This tree has been progressively created as
a new node joins the group.6.1. Tree update due to a join
As described in Section 5.3, after the join of a new node,
the GC maintains the LNT tree based on the selected parent
returned by the joining node.
The joining node sends a neighbor-discovery-request
message to discover neighbors which are members of
group Gid. The neighbor-discovery-request contains a
parameter hopCount which specifies that the joining node
is looking for neighbors that are at maximum hopCount
far from the GC and a parameter hop that specifies how
many times the neighbor-discovery-request will be for-
warded. Each member of group Gid receiving this request
responds by sending a neighbor-discovery-reply message.
Only nodes that have a lower hopCount away from the
GC respond. This guarantees that only nodes on the path
from the joining node to the GC could be a parent of the
joining node. If the node is not a member of the requested
group, it will decrement the value of hopand forward the
neighbor-discovery-requestmessage if the value of hop is
still greater than zero. This mechanism of forwarding the
neighbor-discovery-requestmessage permits to search for
neighbors farther than one-hop.
The neighbor-discovery-reply message contains parame-
ters that reflect the position of the node in the physical
topology and the logical tree namely the physicalhop, the
logicalhop, and the childNbr. The physicalhop indicates the
distance in terms of hops between the GC and the node
in the physical topology, the logicalhop represents the
number of hops between the GC and the node in the logical
tree, and the childNbr represents the number of nodes at-
tached to the node. If the joining node does not receive
any reply from its immediate neighbors, it will search for
a two-hop neighbor. For this reason, it will increment the
value of hop and decrement the value of hopCount. This
process will be repeated until receiving a reply. On receiv-
ing neighbor-discovery-replymessages, the joining node se-
lects a neighbor as a parent. The selection of the parent
node is based on first the physicalhop, then the logicalhop
and then the childNbr. Therefore, if the joining node re-
ceives replies from more than one neighbor with the same
physicalhop then it selects the node with the smallest logi-
calhop. If more than one neighbor has the same physicalhop
and logicalhop, the joining node selects the one with the
small childNbr. Otherwise, if all the mentioned parameters
are equal, then the choice can be based on the RSSI (Re-
ceived Signal Strength Indication) or arbitrary. The physi-
calhop parameter promotes a tree with a minimum
transmission cost. The logicalhop and childNbr parameters
promote a balanced tree which speeds up the rekeying
process. The joining node sends then a parent-update mes-
sage to the GC. The latter informs the parent to add the
joining node to its child list. The GC also updates the logical
tree. The joining node broadcasts a neighbor reply message
informing nodes that there is a new path to the GC with the
indicated cost. Neighbor nodes that receive this message
can then update their parents by sending a parent-update
message to the GC.
Let us assume, for example, that node 23 wants to join
the group as shown in Fig. 4. After its join, node 23 discov-
ers its neighbors. For this reason, it broadcasts a neighbor-
Fig. 5. LNT tree construction.
Fig. 4. Physical network topology.discovery-request message that contains the group identity
Gid, with hopCount = 3 and hop initially equal to 1. Each
node belonging to the group Gid and hearing the neigh-
bor-discovery-request message replies with a neighbor-dis-
covery-reply message. This message contains the node
identity, the physicalhop (number of hops between the
node and the GC in the physical topology), the logicalhop
(number of hops between the node and the GC in the log-
ical tree) and the childNbr (the number of child nodes at-
tached to this node).
In our case, node 23 has three neighbors {19,11,20},
which would respond respectively with (19,3,3,0),
(11,2,2,1), and (20,2,2,2). First node 23 selects node 11
and node 20 as they present the smallest physicalhop value.
Then node 23 views the logicalhop value. As node 11 and
node 20 have the same logicalhop value, the joining node
(node 11) views the third parameter with is the childNbr
value. As node 11 has the smallest childNbr (1), it would
be selected by node 23 as the parent node. Node 23 then
informs the group controller by sending a parent-update
message containing the address of node 11. Upon receiving
this message, the GC informs node 11 to add node 23 to its
child list.6.2. Tree update due to a leave
The LNT tree has two types of nodes: leaf nodes, which
are nodes without any attached child node, and parent
nodes, which are nodes with one or more children. Leaf
nodes are those located at the bottom of the tree, while
the parent nodes are intermediate nodes between a GC
and leaf nodes.
The leaving of a leaf node requires simply the send of a
child-update message to the parent node. Let us assume,
for example, that node 15 in Fig. 4 wants to leave the
group. In this case, the GC sends a child-update message
to node 6, which is node 15’s parent, to remove node 15
from its child node list. In this way, node 15 is no longer
member of the group.
The leaving of a parent node is more complicated than
the leaving of a leaf node as, for a parent node, its child
nodes (descendant nodes) must be attached to another
parent. Instead of node 15, let us assume that node 6 wants
to leave the group. The update of the LNT tree can be
launched in two ways. Either, node 6 informs child nodes
{12,13} about its leave, or node 6 informs the GC about
its leave, and the latter requests the child nodes to re-send
Fig. 6. LNT tree update.an updated address of their parents. In both cases, each
child node should re-find another parent using the neigh-
bor discovery process and then inform the GC. Therefore,
after the leaving of node 6, associated child nodes
{12,13} renew their parents as follows. Node 12 with
neighbor members {16,17} selects node 16 as parent, and
node 13 with neighbor {14} selects node 14 as a parent.
The new LNT resulting from the join of node 23 and the
leaving of node 15 and node 6 is presented in Fig. 6.
Note that, if node 6 leaves silently (e.g. due to energy
exhaustion), child nodes will detect that the link to parent
(node 6) is no more available, and so, they search for a new
parent.7. LNT rekeying process
The previously described tree will be used by the group
controller in order to update the group key. More precisely,
this tree is used in the distribution of the rekeying
messages.7.1. Description
After each membership change, the GC updates the
group key. For this purpose, the GC generates a new group
key and then delivers it to the group members.
To protect the key-update message from replay attack a
sequence number was added. The signature avoids an at-
tacker to inject a false key update on behalf of the GC.
Moreover, to protect the group key from eavesdropping,
the GC protects it by means of encryption.
In the case of a join operation, the GC uses the current
group key to encrypt the new one, and then sends the
key-update message to its child nodes. Upon receiving the
key update message, a non-leaf node first verifies the sig-
nature and then forwards it, in its turn, to its child nodes.
The key update process continues until reaching all leaf
nodes in the tree. Therefore, in the case of a join operation,
the key-update message has the following format:
mku = Gid,seqNbr, {GK0}GK,sign.
In a leave operation, the leaving node knows the current
group key and, therefore, it is necessary to use pairwise
keys for encryption so that the GC sends a separate key-up-
date message to each child node by unicast. Upon receivingthe key update message, a non-leaf node first verifies the
signature and then decrypts the new group key and then
re-encrypts it separately for each child node. Therefore,
in the case of a leave operation, the key-update message
has the following format: mku = Gid,seqNbr, {GK0}PWK,sign,
where PWK is the pairwise key shared between a parent
and its child node.
The signature (sign) is computed over the Gid, seqNbr
and GK fields so that these fields are authenticated and
protected from modification.
The GC with (dG,QG) as its private and public keys
respectively, generates the signature using the ECDSA as
follows:
1. Selects a random integer k from interval [1;r  1];
2. Computes kG = (x1;y1) and s1 = x1 mod n. If s1 = 0 go to
step 1;
3. Computes k1 mod n;
4. Computes h(mku), where h is a hash function e.g. the
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1).
5. Computes s2 = k1(h(mku) + dG.s1) modn. If s2 = 0 go to
step 1.
sign = (s1;s2) is the GC signature of message mku.
A group member receiving this signature verifies it
using the ECDSA as follows:
1. Verifies that s1 and s2 are integers in [1; r  1];
2. Computes h(m);
3. Computes w = s21 mod n;
4. Computes u1 = h(mku).w mod n and u2 = s1.w mod n;
5. Computes u1G + u2QG = (x1;y1);
6. Computes v = x1 mod n;
The group member accepts the signature if and only if
v = s1.
7.2. Performance evaluation
In this section, we present the analytical performance of
the proposed schemes during the rekeying process. The
performance evaluation criteria are the computation cost,
the communication cost, the storage cost and the duration.
In what follows we present the analytical performance of
the rekeying process of our proposed LNT scheme.
Table 6
Blundo parameters.
Notations Meaning
t Is the degree of the polynomial (t reflects the scheme
security: the scheme is t-collusion)
q Is the large prime number, so large to accommodate a
cryptographic key (q reflects the key size). NB: the size
of q= key size = the size of the polynomial coefficients7.2.1. Computation cost
The computation cost depends on the membership
operation and is as follows:
Case of join.
 Group controller: Ckg + Cenc + Csign
 End device: Cdec + Cverif
Case of leave.
 Group controller: Ckg + d(Ckc + Cenc) + Csign
 End device: Ckc + Cverif + Cdec + d(Ckc + Cenc)
In case of join, the group controller needs to generate a
new group key (Ckg), encrypts it using current group key
(Cenc), signs the message (Csign) and then sends it. An end
device receiving this message verifies the signature (Cverif)
and then decrypts the group key (Cdec).
Regarding the leave case, the group controller encrypts
the new group key separately using pairwise keys shared
with its child nodes (d(Ckc + Cenc)). An end device needs to
verify the signature (Cverif), decrypt the message (Cdec),
and then forward it to its child nodes (d(Ckc + Cenc)).
7.2.2. Communication cost
Every node sends d messages and receives 1 message
(communication cost is O(1)). More specifically, single
node communication cost is: jmkujerx + djmkujetx =
jmkuj(erx + detx). Please refer to Table 3 for parameters
definition.
7.2.3. Storage cost
The storage cost is computed as the number of bytes
that the sensor node (group controller or group member)
has to store. Generally, this storage cost is introduced by
the storage of different parameters and keys necessary to
the operation of the LNT scheme. The proposed secure
group communication scheme does not require much
memory overhead. In fact, due to Blundo et al.’s key distri-
bution technique, each sensor node has to store a polyno-
mial function which occupies (t + 1)logq storage space,
where t stands for the degree of the polynomial and log(q)
represents the size of the keys [38]. Moreover, each
member has to store the ECC domain parameters
T = (p,a,b,G,r,h) [31,39].
In addition, a group member has to store the group key,
the address of the parent and child nodes, as well as the GC
address and public key QG for each group it belongs to. The
GC also stores the members’ addresses that belong to its
group and the pair of private/public key (dG,QG). As for
the base station, it has to store the GC address correspond-
ing to each group as well as the black list containing the list
of compromised nodes. The following equations summa-
rize the storage cost at each entity, for a group of n nodes:
 The group controller has to store:
– The neighbor tree = nsizeof(ID)
– The Blundo polynomial share = (t + 1)log(q), where t
and q are defined in Table 6.
– A Private/public key.
 The end device has to store:
– The neighbors’ addresses = dsizeof(ID).– The Blundo polynomial share = (t + 1)log(q).
– The public key of the group controller.
7.2.4. Duration
The key update duration is the time needed to renew a
group key and it corresponds to the time elapsed between
the beginning of the key update process and its termina-
tion. The duration is composed of the processing time,
the transmission time and the propagation time. The pro-
cessing time includes the time for generating the key, the
time for encrypting and deciphering the key, etc.
Case of join. Key update duration is Tkuj = Tkg + Tsign +
Tenc + dhopjmkujTtx + (h  1)(Tdec + Tverif + dhopjmkujTtx).
The key-update process begins with the generation of a
group key (Tkg), then the GC encrypts it (Tenc), signs
the message (Tsign) and sends it to its child nodes
(dhopjmkujTtx), where hop is the average number of phys-
ical hops between a parent and its child node. A group
member receiving this key-update message, first decrypts
the group key (Tdec), then verifies the signature (Tverif) and
finally forwards the message to its d child nodes
(dhopjmkujTtx). Considering a tree with level h (the GC
is at level 0 and non-leaf group members are at level 1 to
level h  1), the key-update message received by the last
GC’ child node needs (h  1)(Tdec + Tverif + dhopjmkujTtx)
to reach the last child nodes in the logical tree. More pre-
cisely, (h  1) is the number of level in the tree containing
non-leaf group members.
Case of leave. Key update duration is
Tkul ¼ Tkg þ Tsign þ d  ðTkc þ TencÞ þ d  hop  jmkuj  Ttx
þ ðh 1Þ  ðTkc þ Tdec þ Tverif þ d  ðTkc þ TencÞ
þ d  hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
¼ Tkg þ Tsign þ ðh 1Þ  ðTkc þ Tdec þ Tverif Þ
þ h  d  ðTkc þ Tenc þ hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
In case of a group leave, the encryption of the group key is
done using pairwise keys so that a group member must re-
encrypts the received group key separately to each d child
nodes (d(Tkc + Tenc)).
8. Performance comparison
In order to highlight the performance of the LNT
scheme, we compared its performance against some
well-known existing schemes in the literature. As the
majority of works address only the group key management
problem, comparison was made with some well-known
group key management schemes such as LKH, TKH and Ri-
SeG rekeying processes.
LKH [3] is a well-known and basic scheme on which
several group rekeying schemes are based
[40,4,41,14,15, 5,6]. TKH [5] is a group rekeying scheme
that uses the concept of matching the physical topology
to the logical key hierarchy. RiSeG [9,8] is a secure group
communication that uses the concept of logical ring
topology.
In what follows, we present the rekeying scheme and its
performance evaluation.8.1. Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
In the LKH group rekeying scheme, the group control-
ler maintains a logical key tree. The root of the key tree is
the group key and it is shared by all group members. The
leaf nodes of the key tree are individual keys shared only
between the individual group members and the group
controller. The middle level keys are auxiliary key encryp-
tion keys used to facilitate the distribution of the group
key [3].
In this scheme, each group member maintains all the
keys on the path from its individual leaf node to the root
of the key tree. As a result, when a user leaves or joins
the group, in order to maintain forward and backward data
confidentiality, all those keys have to be changed and
redistributed.
To illustrate the LKH scheme, we consider in Fig. 7 a tree
with height h = 4 and degree d = 4 (number of nodes is dh).
In case of a joining/leaving, the group controller renews all
the keys on the path of the joining/leaving node to the root,
and then, delivers them to the appropriate nodes. Thus,
when a node joins/leaves the group, the GC needs to
change h keys, including the group key (Kg).Fig. 7. LKHThe LKH scheme proposes three strategies to deliver
these new keys as follows:
User-Oriented Rekeying. In user-oriented rekeying the
group controller constructs a rekey message that contains
precisely the new keys needed by the user (group member)
and encrypts them using a key held by the user. As an illus-
tration, we take the example of the joining (respectively
the leaving) of Node N1114 presented in Fig. 7. The follow-
ing keys have to be updated {kg,K1,K11,K111}. For this
purpose, the group controller must send the messages pre-
sented in Fig. 8a (respectively Fig. 9a).
Key-Oriented Rekeying. In this approach, each new key is
encrypted individually. Considering the joining (respec-
tively the leaving) of Node N1114 presented in Fig. 7, the
group controller must send the messages presented in
Fig. 8b (respectively Fig. 9b).
Group-Oriented Rekeying. A single rekey message is con-
structed containing all new keys.The same encrypted keys
computed in key oriented approach (Fig. 8) are broadcast
to all group members in a one single message. This ap-
proach has a high communication overhead as all group
members are obliged to receive a big key-update message
even if it does not need all the contained keys. Therefore,
this approach will not be considered in what follows.
The performance of the LKH scheme depends on
whether approach is used and on the membership opera-
tion (join or leave).8.1.1. Computation cost
The computation cost of the LKH scheme is presented
differently for the case of join and leave. Note that in both
cases the group controller generates h keys. However, the
number of encryptions is different and it also depends on
the rekeying approach.tree.
Fig. 8. LKH rekeying due to a join.
Fig. 9. LKH rekeying due to a leave.Case of join.
 Group controller: In the user-oriented rekeying, the
number of encryptions is 1þ 2þ . . . þ h ¼ h  ðhþ1Þ2 .
So, the GC computation cost is = h  Ckgþ
h  ðhþ1Þ2  CencIn the key-oriented rekeying, the num-
ber of encryptions is h. So, the GC computation cost
is = hCkg + hCenc
 End device: It depends on its position in the key tree.
The number of changed key could be {1, 2, . . . , h}. So
the average number of decryptions is avg(1, . . . , h) =
(h + 1)/2. So, the ED computation cost is = ðhþ1Þ2  Cdec .
Case of leave.
 Group controller: In the user-oriented rekeying, the
number of encryptions is ðd 1Þð1þ 2þ . . . þ hÞ ¼
ðd 1Þ  h  ðhþ1Þ2 . So, the GC computation cost is =
h  Ckg þ ðd 1Þ  h  ðhþ1Þ2  CencIn the key-oriented
rekeying, the number of encryptions is dh  1. So,
the GC computation cost is = hCkg + (dh  1)Cenc
We note that, the key-oriented approach is more
computationally-efficient than the user-oriented
approach.
 End device: It depends on its position in the key tree.
The number of changed key could be {1, 2, . . . , h}. So
the average number of decryption is avg(1, . . . , h) =
(h + 1)/2. So, the ED computation cost is=ðhþ1Þ2  Cdec.8.1.2. Communication cost
In LKH, the communication cost is O(log(n)). Moreover,
we have to distinguish if the network has a multicast rout-
ing support or not. We define jmkuj as the size of a key-up-
date message containing one key.
Case of join. The rekeying messages sent by the GC due
to a join operation are presented in Fig. 8.
 Group controller: In the user-oriented rekeying, the
GC needs to send a multicast message containing 1
key to (d  1)dh1 nodes, . . ., a multicast message
containing h  1 keys to (d  1)d nodes, a multicast
message containing h keys to d  1 nodes. So, the GC
communication cost in the user-oriented approach
and using a multicast routing protocol is:ð1þ . . . þ h 1þ hÞ  jmkuj  etx ¼ h  hþ 12  jmkuj  etxIf the network does not support multicast, each multicast
message must be sent by unicast. So, the GC communica-
tion cost becomes:ð1  ðd 1Þ  dh1 þ    þ ðh 1Þ  ðd 1Þ  d
þ h  ðd 1ÞÞ  jmkuj  etx
¼ ðd 1Þðdh1 þ    þ ðh 1Þ  dþ hÞ  jmkuj  etx
In the key-oriented rekeying, all rekeying messages con-
tains one key and the GC needs to send a message destined
to dh  1 nodes, a message destined to dh1  1 nodes, . . ., a
message destined to d  1 nodes. Using a multicast routing
support, the GC communication cost in the key-oriented
approach is:Table 7
LKH rek
Com
Com
u
Com
uh  jmkuj  etx
Without a multicast routing support, the GC communica-
tion cost in the key-oriented approach is:ðdh þ    þ d hÞ  jmkuj  etx
¼ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj  etxCase of leave. The rekeying messages sent by the GC due
to a leave operation are presented in Fig. 9.
 Group controller: In the user-oriented approach, the
GC sends (d  1) messages each one contains one
key and is destined to dh1 nodes, (d  1) messages
each one contains two keys and is destined to
dh  2 nodes, . . ., (d  1) messages each one contains
(h  1) keys and is destined to d nodes and (d  1)
messages each one contains h keys and is destined
to 1 nodes. So, the communication cost of the GC
during the rekeying process due to a leave operation,
in the user-oriented approach and using multicast
is:ð1  ðd 1Þ þ    þ ðh 1Þ  ðd 1Þ
þ h  ðd 1ÞÞ  jmkuj  etx
¼ ðd 1Þ  h  hþ 1
2
 jmkuj  etxWithout the multicast routing support, the GC communi-
cation cost is:ð1  ðd 1Þ  dh1 þ    þ ðh 1Þ  ðd 1Þ  dþ h  ðd
 1ÞÞ  jmkuj  etx
¼ ðd 1Þðdh1 þ    þ ðh 1Þ  dþ hÞ  jmkuj  etxIn the key-oriented rekeying, all rekeying messages con-
tain one key and the GC needs to send d messages each
one is destined to dh1 nodes (except one message is des-
tined to dh1  1), d messages each one is destined to
dh2 nodes (except one message is destined to dh2  1),
. . ., d messages each one is destined to d nodes (except
one message is destined to d  1), d  1 messages each
one is destined to 1 nodes. Using a multicast routing sup-
port, the GC communication cost in the key-oriented ap-
proach is:eying approach comparison.
Case of join Cas
User-oriented Key-oriented Use
putation cost h  Ckg þ h  ðhþ1Þ2  Cenc hCkg + hCenc h  C
munication cost
sing multicast
h  hþ12  jmkuj  etx hjmkujetx ðd
munication cost
sing unicast
(d  1)(dh1+   
+(h  1)d + h)jmkujetx
ðd  1dh1d  hÞ  jmkuj  etx (d ðd  h 1Þ  jmkuj  etx:
Without a multicast routing support, the GC communica-
tion cost in the key-oriented approach is:½d  ðdh1 þ    þ dþ 1Þ  h  jmkuj  etx
¼ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj  etx
 End device: Every node has to forward the rekeying
messages sent by the GC. The number of received
messages depends on its position on the network.
If we use broadcast to send messages, every node
will receive and forward all messages sent by the GC.
8.1.3. Storage cost
 Group controller has to store: The logical key hierarchy
tree, which contains= ðd
ðhþ1Þ1Þ
ðd1Þ
h i
keys  ð dd1Þ  n keys,
where n = dh. So, storage cost is O(n).
Moreover, the GC must store the identity of group
members = njIDj.
Example: for a 128 bits key and n = 1024 and binary
tree (d = 2), we get storage = (2048  16 bytes = 32 Kbytes)
which exceeds the TelosB RAM (equal to 10 Kbytes).
Therefore, it can be concluded that LKH presents a stor-
age cost problem.
 End device has to store: h + 1 keys.
LKH rekeying approach comparison: From Table 7, we
can clearly note that the key-oriented approach is more
efficient than the user-oriented approach in terms of com-
putation and communication cost.
8.1.4. Duration
The key update duration for the LKH scheme is defined
as the sum of the processing time and the transmission
time. The processing time can be directly extracted from
the Table 7 by simply replacing Cop by Top, where op repre-
sents an operation such as encryption, signature, etc.
As for the transmission time, it contains the transmis-
sion time needed to send all key-update messages by the
GC and the transmission time needed to forward a key-up-
date message from the GC to a group member. This time is
expressed as hopjmkujTtx, where hop is the average num-
ber of hops between the GC and a group member.
Moreover, we consider only the key-oriented approach
as it is the most efficient approach. The computation and
communication time of the different version of the LKH
scheme are summarized in Table 8.e of leave
r-oriented Key-oriented
kg þ ðd 1Þ  h  ðhþ1Þ2  Cenc hCkg + (dh  1)Cenc
1Þ  h  hþ12  jmkuj  etx (dh  1)jmkujetx
1)(dh1+ . . . +(h  1)d + h)jmkujetx d  1dh1d  h
 
 jmkuj  etx
Table 8
LKH processing and transmission time at the GC.
Case of join Case of leave
LKH LKH + Sign LKH LKH + Sign
Processing time h(Tkg + Tenc) h(Tkg + Tenc + Tsign) hTkg + (dh  1)Tenc hTkg + (dh  1)(Tenc + Tsign)
LKH LKH + Multi LKH LKH + Multi
Transmission time d  1dh1d  h
 
 jmkuj  Ttx hjmkujTtx d  1d
h
1d  h
 
 jmkuj  Ttx (dh  1)jmkujTtxBased on this table, resulting rekeying durations are as
follows:
Case of join. The key update duration (latency) depends
on whether the network has a multicast routing sup-
port or not.
 Without multicast support: In this case, we use uni-
cast. So, a multicast message is replaced by several
unicast ones.Duration ¼ h  ðTkg þ TencÞ þ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj
 Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  TtxThe quantity (hopTtx) is the time needed for the forward-
ing of the last message by intermediate nodes, where hop
represents the average number of hops between group
controller and group members.
 With multicast support:The multicast routing sup-
port allows to reduce the number of sent messages
as several unicast messages will be replaced by a sin-
gle multicast one. However, the latency of the send-
ing of a multicast message depends on the position
of destination nodes in the physical topology. So
the latency of a multicast message is the time
between the sending of the message by the group
controller and the receiving of this message by the
latest destination.Duration ¼ h  ðTkg þ TencÞ þ h  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop
 jmkuj  Ttx:Case of leave. In the LKH scheme, after the leaving of a
node the GC needs to send the messages presented in
Fig. 9b. The key update duration contains the processing
time (computation time), the transmitting time (com-
munication time) and the propagation time. The key
update duration (latency) depends on whether the net-
work has a multicast routing support or not.
 Without multicast support:
In this case, we use unicast. So, a multicast message
is replaced by several unicast ones.Duration ¼ h  Tkg þ ðd  h 1Þ  Tenc
þ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj  Ttx þ hop
 jmkuj  Ttx
The quantity (hopTtx) is the time needed for the forward-
ing of the last message by intermediate nodes, where hoprepresents the average number of hops between group
controller and group members.
 With multicast support:The multicast routing sup-
port allows to reduce the number of sent messages
as several unicast messages will be replaced by a sin-
gle multicast one. However, the latency of a multi-
cast message depends on the position of
destination nodes in the physical topology. So the
latency of a multicast message is the time between
the sending of the message by the group controller
and the receiving of this message by the latest
destination.Duration ¼ h  Tkg þ ðd  h 1Þ  Tenc þ ðd  h 1Þ
 jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx:8.2. Topological Key Hierarchy (TKH)
In the TKH scheme, the key tree is constructed in the
following way. First we construct a routing tree (each node
is attached to a parent node until reaching the sink node,
which is the group controller). Then, for each neighbor of
the sink we construct a Tree Key (TK) and for each set of
neighbors to that node we construct a Sibling Key (SK).
That is, the level of the key tree is always 4, independently
from the number of group members, and each node holds 4
keys, which are a Group Key (GK), TK, SK, and an Individual
key (IK). Fig. 10 explains the tree construction in the TKH
scheme.
As shown in Fig. 11, the TKH tree can be modeled as an
abc -tree,where the meaning of a, b, and c are presented in
Table 9. More precisely, a represents the number of neigh-
bors to the sink (the group controller), and c the number of
neighbors to a parent node.
We will consider a tree with a = 5, b = 40, c = 5 in order
to obtain a number of nodes n = (cb + 1)a.
n = 1030  1024 as similar with other simulations.
In case of a join, the authors propose to renew the keys
locally using a one-way hash function. However, they do
not present how to launch this key-update process in
group members nor what messages need to be sent. In-
deed, when a new node joins the group, the GC must in-
form group members in order to update their
corresponding keys. So different messages must be sent
according to the group member position in the hierarchy.
Moreover, these messages must be authenticated (for
example using a signature) otherwise an attacker can dis-
turb a group operation by sending fake messages to group
members that will renew keys uselessly.
Fig. 10. (a) A sensor network tree topology example and (b) the corresponding TKH key tree structure.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11. (a) ‘abc-tree’ and (b) the corresponding TKH key tree structure [5].
Table 9
TKH parameters.
Notations Meaning
a Number of subtrees
b Number of sibling sets per subtree
c Number of sibling nodes per sibling set
n Number of nodes in the group. n = a(bc + 1)As authors do not present details of group rekeying due
to a join operation, we consider in what follows only the
rekeying cost due to a leave operation.
When a node leaves, the GC needs to change 3 keys GK,
TK, SK. According to the network model presented in
Fig. 11, the following rekeying messages are sent by the
GC.
 GK requires a multicast, each multicast for cb nodes
ðfGK0gTKi Þ TK requires
– b multicast, each multicast for c nodes ( TK 0i
 
SKj
)
– 1 unicast for the sub-router, which is also a neighbor
node
 SK requires c  1 unicast messages SK 0j
n o
IKl
 
8.2.1. Computation cost
The computation cost of the TKH group key manage-
ment scheme during the rekeying process due to a leave
operation is as follows:
 Group controller:
- Number of key generations = 3
- Number of encryptions = (c  1) + (1 + b) + a =
a + b + c
With the above example parameters, the number of
encryptions is: 5 + 40 + 5 = 50 > log(n).
So, the GC computation cost during a rekeying due to a
leave operation is: 3Ckg + (a + b + c).Cenc.
 End device:
– Number of decryption (maximum) = 3
So, the end device computation cost is: 3CdecNote that
the computation cost of an end device is independent from
the group size.
8.2.2. Communication cost
In TKH, the communication cost in terms of number of
rekeying messages is > O(log(n)).
 Group controller:
Using a multicast routing support, the GC communica-
tion cost is:ðaþ bþ cÞ  jmkuj  etx
Without a multicast routing support, the GC communica-
tion cost is:ða  b  cþ b  cþ cÞ  jmkuj  etx
 Every node (must forward the rekeying messages): This
depends on its position on the network, as it must for-
ward the rekeying messages sent by the GC. However,
as there is a mapping between the TKH and the network
topology, the communication overhead is reduced com-
pared to LKH.
8.2.3. Storage cost
 The group controller has to store: The TKH tree, which
contains the following keys: GK + a TK + abSK + nIK.
So the number of keys is = (1 + a + ab + n) = 1 + n + a
(1 + b). The storage cost is O(n). Example: for a 128 bits
key and n = 1024 and c = 4, We get storage = 20 Kbytes,
which exceeds the TelosB RAM. TKH presents a storage
cost problem.
 The end device has to store: 4 keys.
8.2.4. Duration
During the rekeying process due to a leave, the GC sends
c  1 unicast + 1 neighbor unicast + b multicast (each
message is for c nodes) + a multicast (each message is
for bc nodes). Each message contains 1 encrypted key.
 Without multicast support
Duration ¼ 3  Tkg þ ðaþ bþ cÞ  Tenc þ ða  b  cþ b
 cþ cÞ  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx With multicast support
Duration ¼ 3  Tkg þ ðaþ bþ cÞ  Tenc þ ðcþ bþ aÞ
 jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
As an example: for n = 1024(a = 5, b = 40, d = 5) and
Ttx = 1 ms and hop = 3 we get TKH duration = (5 + 40 +
5 + 3)  1 ms = 54 ms > LKH.
8.3. Ring based Secure Group communication (RiSeG)
RiSeG [8,9] is the first scheme that has addressed the se-
cure group communication problem with a constrainedgroup controller. The idea of the scheme is to divide the
group controller task among group members by construct-
ing a logical ring architecture. This logical ring permits to
deliver rekeying messages as follows. The GC sends the
rekeying message to next hop in the ring and then the mes-
sage will be forwarded from node to node until returning
back to the GC. The scheme reduces the communication,
computation and storage cost at the group controller, how-
ever, it introduces a big duration that cannot scalewith large
group. In fact the duration of the rekeying process is O(n).
8.3.1. Computation cost
In case of a join operation, the GC generates a group key,
encrypts it, signs it and sends two key-update messages so
that the GC performs Ckg + Cenc + Csign. Upon receiving the
key-updatemessage a group member verifies the signature,
decrypts the key and then forwards the message so that a
group member performs Cverif + Cdec.
In case of a leave operation, the GC generates the group
key, signs it and then sends two key-update messages con-
taining group key encrypted using pair-wise key so that
the GC performs Ckg + Csign + 2Ckc + 2Cenc. Upon receiving a
key update message a group member decrypts the key,
verifies the signature, and then re-encrypts message and
forwards it so that a group member performs 2Ckc + Cdec +
Cverif + Cenc.
Case of join.
 Group controller: Ckg + Cenc + Csign
 End device: Cdec + Cverif
Case of leave.
 Group controller: Ckg + Csign + 2Ckc + 2Cenc
 End device: 2Ckc + Cdec + Cverif + Cenc
8.3.2. Communication cost
Regarding the key update process communication cost,
in both cases (join and leave), the GC sends two key-update
messages so that it consumes 2jmkuj  etx while a group
member receives 1 key-update message and sends 1 key-
update message so that it consumes jmkuj.erx + jmkuj.etx =
jmkuj. (erx + etx).
Hence we can note that the RiSeG rekeying process
communication cost is O(1).
8.3.3. Storage cost
 Group controller:
– The ring topology = nsizeof(ID)
– The Blundo polynomial share = (t + 1)log(q)
– The ECC domain parameters T = (p,a,b,G,r,h), and
the pair of GC public/private key (QG,dG)
 End device stores:
– The next hop and previous hop (in the ring)
addresses = 2sizeof(ID)
– The Blundo polynomial share = (t + 1)log(q)
– The ECC domain parameters T = (p,a,b,G,r,h), and
the GC public key QG
8.3.4. Duration
In the RiSeG scheme, and in case of a rekeying caused by
a join operation, the same key update message is
Table 10
Storage and computation cost comparison.
Scheme Storage cost Computation cost (single node joining) Computation cost (single node leaving)
LKH [3]  GC:ðdðhþ1Þ1Þðd1Þ keys + njIDj  dd1
 	  n keys +
njIDj
 ED: h keys
 GC:hCkg + hCenc
 ED:ðhþ1Þ2  Cdec
 GC:hCkg + (dh  1)Cenc
 ED:ðhþ1Þ2  Cdec
LKH [3]+Sign  GC: dd1
 	  n keys + njIDj + T + (dG, QG)
 ED:h keys + T + QG
 GC:h(Ckg + Cenc + Csign)
 ED:ðhþ1Þ2  ðCdec þ Cverif Þ
 GC:hCkg + (dh  1)(Cenc + Csign)
 ED:ðhþ1Þ2  ðCdec þ Cverif Þ
TKH [5]  GC: (1 + a + ab + n) keys + njIDj
 ED: 4
N/A  GC:3Ckg + (a + b + c)Cenc
 ED: 3Cdec
TKH [5]+ Sign  GC: (1 + a + ab + n) + T + (dG, QG)
 ED:4 + T + QG
N/A  GC: 3Ckg + (a + b + c)(Cenc + Csign)
 ED: 3(Cdec + Cverif)
RiSeG [8,9]  GC: njIDj + (t + 1)log(q) + T + (dG, QG)
 ED: 2jIDj + (t + 1)log(q) + T + QG
 GC: Ckg + Cenc + Csign
 ED: Cdec + Cverif
 GC: Ckg + 2Ckc + 2Cenc + Csign
 ED: 2Ckc + Cenc + Cdec + Cverif
LNT  GC: njIDj + (t + 1)log(q) + Private/public key
 ED: djIDj + (t + 1)log(q) + GC public key.
 GC: Ckg + Cenc + Csign
 ED: Cdec + Cverif
 GC: Ckg + d(Ckc + Cenc) + Csign
 ED: Ckc + Cverif + Cdec + d(Ckc + Cenc)
N/A: Information not available.
Table 11
Communication cost comparison.
Scheme Communication cost (single node joining) Communication cost (single node leaving)
LKH [3]  GC: d  1dh1d  h
 
 jmkuj  etx  GC: d  1dh1d  h
 
 jmkuj  etx
 ED: ðhþ1Þ2  jmkuj  erx
LKH + Multicast  GC: hjmkujetx  GC: (hd  1)jmkujetx  hdjmkujetx = dlogd(n)jmkujetx
 ED: ðhþ1Þ2  jmkuj  erx
TKH [5] N/A  GC: (abc + bc + c)jmkujetx
TKH + Multicast N/A  GC: (a + b + c)jmkujetx
RiSeG [8,9]  GC: 2jmkujetx
 ED: jmkuj(erx + etx)
LNT  GC: djmkujetx
 ED: jmkuj(erx + detx)propagated from node to node. Therefore, a group member
needs to decipher the group key, verifies the signature and
then forwards the rekeying message
(Tdec + Tverif + hopjmkujTtx).
For the case of a rekeying caused by a leave operation,
the group member must also re-encrypt the group key
using pairwise key.
Case of join  Tkuj ¼Tkg þTenc þTsign þ2 hop  jmkuj  Ttx
þn
2
 ðTdec þTverif þhop  jmkuj  TtxÞ:
Case of leave  Tkul ¼Tkg þTsign þ2  ðTkc þ Tenc þ2 hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
þn
2
 ðTkc þTdec þTverif þ Tkc þTenc þhop  jmkuj  TtxÞ:8.3.4.1. Comparative table and analysis. In this section, we
show a comparison between the LNT proposed scheme
rekeying process and the LKH and TKH schemes.
As LKH and TKH rekeying schemes do not add authenti-
cation to rekeying messages, we consider adding a signa-
ture to these protocols. Therefore, we refer to
‘‘LKH + Sign’’ (respectively ‘‘TKH + sign’’) to represent the
LKH (respectively TKH) scheme where messages are
authenticated using a signature mechanism. In this way,
schemes are compared in the same context. In the same
way, we note ‘‘LKH + Multicast’’ (respectively ‘‘TKH + Mul-
ticast’’) to designate the LKH (respectively TKH) schemewith the multicast routing capabilities. Moreover, we con-
sider the LKH scheme in its efficient way (i.e, the key-ori-
ented approach).
Table 10 establishes a comparison between the studied
schemes in terms of storage and computation cost.
Table 11 shows the communication cost of the studied
schemes.
Table 12 summarizes the rekeying duration of the stud-
ied schemes.
Note that, first the proposed schemes suppose that the
GC is a powerful node, while our proposed work assumes
a homogeneous network. That is, the GC is a sensor node
with constrained resources. Second, for the LKH-based
schemes, it is true that they minimize the number of
rekeying messages. However, when considering the deliv-
ery of these rekeying messages, they introduce an over-
head that can exceed the one used to send unicast
messages for each node (with O(n) as communication
cost).
In order to put in evidence the performance comparison
between LNT and the schemes described in Section 8, we
have plotted curves showing the performance of these
schemes when varying the number of group members n.
For the storage cost, the size of keys is set to 128bits.
This keys size is used for AES cryptographic algorithm.
The identity of node is set to 16bits. As shown in Fig. 12,
Table 12
Rekeying duration comparison.
Scheme Rekeying duration
LKH [3] + Sign (unicast) Case of join:
h  ðTkg þ Tenc þ TsignÞ þ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
Case of leave:
h  Tkg þ ðd  h 1Þ  ðTenc þ TsignÞ þ d  1 d
h
1 d  h
!
 jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
LKH [3]+Sign (multicast) Case of join:
h  ðTkg þ Tenc þ TsignÞ þ h  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
Case of leave:
h  Tkg þ ðd  h 1Þ  ðTenc þ TsignÞ þ ðd  h 1Þ  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
TKH [5]+Sign (unicast) Case of leave:
3  Tkg þ ðaþ bþ cÞ  ðTenc þ TsignÞ þ ða  b  cþ b  cþ cÞ  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
TKH [5]+Sign (multicast) Case of leave:
3  Tkg þ ðaþ bþ cÞ  ðTenc þ TsignÞ þ ðcþ bþ aÞ  jmkuj  Ttx þ hop  jmkuj  Ttx
RiSeG [8,9] Case of join:
Tkg þ Tenc þ Tsign þ 2  hop  jmkuj  Ttx þ n2  ðTdec þ Tverif þ hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
Case of leave:
Tkg þ Tsign þ 2  ðTkc þ Tenc þ 2  hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ þ n2  ðTkc þ Tdec þ Tverif þ Tkc þ Tenc
þ hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
LNT Case of join:
Tkg þ Tsign þ Tenc þ d  hop  jmkuj  Ttx þ ðh 1Þ  ðTdec þ Tverif þ d  hop  jmkuj  TtxÞ
Case of leave:
Tkg þ Tsign þ ðh 1Þ  ðTkc þ Tdec þ Tverif Þ þ h  d  ðTkc þ Tenc þ hop  jmkuj  TtxÞthe RiSeG and LNT schemes represent the best storage cost.
Indeed, in both RiSeG and LNT schemes, the GC has to store
only the Blundo polynomial parameters and some other
keys (the group key, the private/public keys, etc.) that are
independent from the number of group members. How-
ever, in both LKH and TKH schemes the number of keys
is proportional to the number of nodes in the group. With
number of group members n = 1024, in the RiSeG and LNT,
the GC storage cost is less than 1Kbyte, however, in the LKH
scheme it reaches 21.3Kbytes and in TKH it reaches
19.2Kbytes.
Moreover, for the total storage cost, the GC needs to
store not only the keys but also the group members iden-
tities (of size 2bytes). Therefore, with n = 1024, LKH re-
quires about 23.3Kbytes, TKH requires 21.2Kbytes, RiSeG
and LNT require 2.1Kbytes of storage space. If we suppose
that these parameters are stored in the ROM memory of
the sensor node, for TelosB motes, which have 48Kbytes
of ROM, LKH and TKH consume about 50% of the availableROM, but, LNT consumes less than 5% of ROM. However, if
these parameters are needed to be loaded in the RAM
memory, for TelosB motes, which have 10Kbytes of RAM,
LKH and TKH storage requirements exceeds the available
memory and so they cannot be implemented in a TelosB
sensor node.
For the communication cost, the unit communication
costs are set to etx = 0.209 lJ and erx = 0.226 lJ from the
characteristics of the CC2420 transceiver used in the
Xbow’s MICA-Z and TelosB sensor nodes [42]. Moreover,
the key update message size is set to 64 bytes (jmkuj = 512
bits), which represents the implemented LNT key update
message size. Fig. 13 shows that the communication cost
at the GC in the LNT scheme is independent from the num-
ber of group members and is smaller than those of the LKH
and TKH schemes. Moreover, for the LKH and TKH
schemes, without using a multicast routing support the
communication cost is very high (for n = 1024 it is
140 mJ for LKH and 127 mJ for TKH). We also note that,
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Fig. 12. Storage cost comparison.
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Fig. 13. Rekeying communication cost comparison.
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Fig. 14. Key update duration comparison.
Table 13
Rekeying duration parameters value.
Parameter Value (ms) Parameter Value
Tenc 2.6 jmkuj 512 bits
Tdec 3.2 etx 0.209 lJ
Tsign 3014 erx 0.226 lJ
Tverif 3839
Tkg 0.12
Tkc 0.908
Tmac 0.261
Ttx 0.04
Tnd 3for LKH and TKH schemes, the rekeying communication
cost resulting from a leave operation is higher than the
rekeying resulting from a join operation (for n = 1024,
LKH GC rekeying communication cost is 518 lJ in case of
join and 1970 lJ in case of leave). However, for RiSeG
and LNT the same communication is consumed by the
group controller in both cases and it is about 50 lJ for Ri-
SeG and 100 lJ for LNT.
Fig. 14 shows the variation of the key update duration
when varying the number of nodes. From the TelosB data-
sheet [43], the transmit data rate is 250 kbps, so, Ttx is
equal to 4 ls (1/250).
The curves presented in Fig. 14 are plotted based on the
equation of Table 12 and using values presented in Ta-
ble 13. These values are obtained from experimental test
on TelosB motes.
From Fig. 14, we note that RiSeG has a big duration as it
was assumed. Moreover, the key update duration due to a
leave operation is bigger than the key update duration due
to a join operation.
Fig. 14 shows that without multicast support LKH has a
bigger key update duration than LNT. With multicast sup-
port, the rekeying duration in case of a leave operation is
57 s for LKH and 150 s for TKH for a group of 1024 nodes.
However, LNT needs only 18 s.
Note that LNT outperforms other group communication
schemes in the following way:
 Storage cost.
 Computation and communication cost at the GC.
 No multicast support is required.
 Alleviate the task of the GC.
9. Security analysis and discussion
This section is devoted to discuss the merits of the dif-
ferent cryptographic tools used in the proposed scheme
and analyze its security. In the design of our scheme a
nonce has been applied in order to prevent replay attacks,
along with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) intended
to avoid impersonation attacks, as well as a signature aim-
ing at providing authentication of the rekeying messages.
The proposed secure group communication scheme pro-
vides the following security services:
 Replay attack robustness: in the proposed scheme,
intercepted messages cannot be replayed by an attacker
as all sent messages are proved to be fresh through anonce or a sequence number. In addition, attackers can-
not modify the value of the nonce (or the seqNbr) as the
message is protected by a MAC.
 Impersonation attack robustness: all sent messages are
protected by a MAC computed over the identity of the
sender node. This prevents attackers from impersonat-
ing legal nodes and, hence, prevents attackers from
gaining access to a group during the group creation
and group join processes or realizing a denial of service
attack during the group leave process.
 Authentication of the rekeying messages: key-update
messages carry a signature computed by the GC. This
signature proves that the key is sent by the GC and,
therefore, precludes an attacker from injecting a fake
group key.
 Backward and forward secrecy: when a new node joins
the group, the group controller generates a new key and
delivers it to the group members. Therefore, the new
node has no means to decrypt the previously exchanged
messages. Moreover, when a node leaves the group, the
group controller generates a new key. This key will be
sent by unicast and, therefore, the leaving node will
be unable to decrypt the future sent messages.
 Collusion attacks robustness: in our scheme, in the case
of a comprise attack detection, the group controller
generates a new key and sends it to the group members.
As this new group key is independent from previously
used keys, the attacker cannot guess the value of this
group key according to the revealed cryptographic
materials obtained from compromised nodes. There-
fore, our scheme is robust against collusion attack.
The generation of the group key can be done by means
of a pseudo-random function, so keys will be
independent.
 Mutual authentication: our scheme achieves mutual
authentication since not only the base station authenti-
cates the requesting node, but also the node authenti-
cates the base station. The authentication of messages
sent by the base station is critical. In fact, if we do not
authenticate the grp-creation-invite message, an
attacker can impersonate the base station by sending
this message even when the group exists. This scenario
will disturb the network operation as there will be a
creation of multiple copies of the same group, each of
which is composed of a single node.
 Remove of compromised nodes: by means of LNTwe are
able to logically evict compromised nodes from the sys-
tem by rekeying, once they are detected by the IDS.
10. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed LNT: a Logical Neighbor
Tree secure group communication scheme that can be ap-
plied to a homogeneous WSN network with a resource-
constrained group controller. The scheme alleviates the
group controller’s task by constructing a logical neighbor
tree that helps deliver the rekeying messages. Performance
analysis has shown that our scheme outperforms the pre-
viously well-known ones in terms of computation, com-
munication and storage costs. LNT scheme can be
improved by replacing the ECC-based digital signature
scheme by a more lightweight method of authentication
such as the use of a key-chain [44].Acknowledgments
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